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THE BLACK TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ky Peterson, a Black transgender man from rural Georgia, had previously 
been brutally raped while walking home.1 Mr. Peterson reported the incident to 
the police, but they never opened an investigation;2 in fact, the police “could 
barely be bothered to file [a] report.”3 As a result, Mr. Peterson began carrying 
a firearm for personal protection.4 
On October 28, 2011, Mr. Peterson was again attacked and raped.5 The 
man—whose advances Mr. Peterson had rejected earlier that night—
approached Mr. Peterson from behind and struck him in the head, rendering 
him unconscious.6 When Mr. Peterson awoke, the stranger was on top of him, 
penetrating him while hurling transphobic insults at him.7 After a lengthy 
struggle, Mr. Peterson reached for his handgun and killed the attacker.8 Mr. Pe-
terson later reported the incident to the police and completed a rape kit, which 
confirmed the brutal nature of his sexual assault.9 Nevertheless, police dis-
missed his claims of rape and self-defense, charging him with “armed robbery, 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law; J.D., Boston University 
School of Law; B.A., Yale University. Many thanks to the editors of the Nevada Law Jour-
nal for holding this important symposium and for their tireless work on this Essay. All errors 
are my own.  
1  See Sunnivie Brydum & Mitch Kellaway, This Black Trans Man Is in Prison for Killing 
His Rapist, ADVOCATE (Apr. 8, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://www.advocate.com/politics/transge 
nder/2015/04/08/black-trans-man-prison-killing-his-rapist [https://perma.cc/S7H4-ABQP]; 
see also Samone Ijoma, False Promises of Protection: Black Women, Trans People & the 
Struggle for Visibility as Victims of Intimate Partner and Gendered Violence, 18 U. MD. L.J. 
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 255, 268 (2018). 
2  Brydum & Kellaway, supra note 1. 
3  Id. 
4  Id. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
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aggravated assault, malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and three 
counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.”10 
Mr. Peterson’s actions arguably fell within the traditional common law def-
inition of self-defense.11 But they clearly fell within Georgia’s expansive Stand 
Your Ground laws, providing among the broadest scope of self-defense protec-
tion for the use of lethal force in public of any state in the country.12 Mr. Peter-
son’s defense lawyer did not even assert a Stand Your Ground defense on his 
behalf, claiming that his race and gender identity would make such a defense 
useless before a rural Georgia jury.13 While Mr. Peterson asserted self-defense, 
he was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison.14 
This story poignantly illustrates the systemic under-enforcement and over-
enforcement of the Black transgender community by law enforcement. 
Transgender people of color, particularly Black transgender individuals, “expe-
rience violence at a disproportionate rate” in the United States.15 Black 
transgender men and women are more likely than their White transgender 
counterparts—and many times more likely than the general population—to 
“experience virtually every category of violence, including transphobic family 
violence, violence in schools and places of public accommodation, and police 
and prison violence.”16 Black transgender individuals face among the highest 
domestic violence rates in the country.17 And murders of Black transgender in-
dividuals have risen dramatically in recent years and are almost certainly un-
derreported.18 
 
10  Id. 
11  See Tamara Rice Lave, Shoot to Kill: A Critical Look at Stand Your Ground Laws, 67 U. 
MIA. L. REV. 827, 832–33 (2013) (describing the difference between Stand Your Ground leg-
islation and traditional self-defense doctrine, which requires a reasonable belief of imminent 
deadly force and a proportional use of force to repel that danger). 
12  See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3–23.1 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.); see also 
Stand Your Ground, GIFFORDS L. CTR., https://giffords.org/lawcenter/gun-laws/policy-areas/ 
guns-in-public/stand-your-ground-laws [https://perma.cc/55U2-PR8C] (summarizing the 
scope of Stand Your Ground laws across the country). 
13  Ijoma, supra note 1, at 269 (“His lawyer did not even present Peterson with a Stand-Your-
Ground defense as an option because he knew such a defense would likely be unsuccessful 
given Peterson’s racial and gender identity.”); see also CAROLINE E. LIGHT, STAND YOUR 
GROUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE 183 (2017). 
14  Ijoma, supra note 1, at 269. 
15  See Carrie L. Buist, LGBTQ Rights in the Fields of Criminal Law and Law Enforcement, 
54 U. RICH. L. REV. 877, 897–98 (2020) (observing that Black transgender individuals “are 
the victims of especially brutal murders in [America]”). 
16  Gabriel Arkles, Gun Control, Mental Illness, and Black Trans and Lesbian Survival, 42 
SW. L. REV. 855, 860 (2013). 
17  See Leonore F. Carpenter & R. Barrett Marshall, Walking While Trans: Profiling of 
Transgender Women by Law Enforcement, and the Problem of Proof, 24 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 5, 9 (2018); see also Buist, supra note 15, at 897. 
18  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 9, 29 n.119. 
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But as illustrated in Mr. Peterson’s case, police intervention and protection 
for this community remain sorely lacking. Years of anecdotal evidence and re-
cent alarming empirical data show a disturbing ambivalence (or worse) from 
police when responding to reports of violence by Black trans victims.19 
“Transgender victims of domestic violence report that calling the police fre-
quently results in the transgender victim being arrested, violence from the po-
lice, or a total failure to respond to the situation.”20 Black transgender women 
regularly report police failing to take reports of violence seriously, because the 
victim is “really a man.”21 Indeed, transgender victims of all backgrounds are 
often as likely to be harassed or sexually abused by police when reporting a 
crime as they are to have their claims treated seriously and investigated.22 
Given this systemic lack of protection from the criminal legal system, 
Black transgender individuals like Mr. Peterson increasingly must rely on self-
protective measures to repel the disproportionate rates of violence to which 
they are subjected. But exercising lawful self-defense exposes the Black 
transgender community to police over-enforcement of their lawful actions. In 
this sense, the community feels the dual effects of historic criminalization of 
the Black community and the transgender community. The centuries’ long 
over-criminalization and over-enforcement of the Black community by police 
is well-documented, including in the availability (or lack thereof) of self-
defense to Black individuals lawfully repelling a violent attack.23 Rather than 
providing an opportunity for expanded self-defense protection, Stand Your 
Ground laws have only reinforced the racially disproportionate impact of self-
defense assertions in criminal adjudications.24 
 
19  See AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: STONEWALLED: POLICE ABUSE AND 
MISCONDUCT AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN THE U.S. 72, 
125–26 (2005). 
20  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17 (“These experiences make transgender violence vic-
tims believe that the police offer very little safety and, in fact, support a belief that they may 
be more dangerous than perpetrators of violence such as domestic abusers.”). 
21  See id.; see also Kae Greenberg, Still Hidden in the Closet: Trans Women and Domestic 
Violence, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 198, 231–32 (2012). 
22  Greenberg, supra note 21, at 230–31, 234. 
23  See, e.g., Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not 
yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1555, 1589 (2013) [hereinafter Lee, Making 
Race Salient] (describing the “especially problematic” influence racial bias has on jurors as-
sessing “claims of self-defense” by Black defendants); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and 
Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 
374 (1996) (“[S]tereotyping can influence decisionmaking [sic] in self-defense cases.”); Ad-
die C. Rolnick, Defending White Space, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 1639, 1673–74 (2019) (critiqu-
ing the “facially race-neutral” laws of self-defense that implicitly incorporate racial fear into 
the assessment of “reasonableness”). 
24  A.B.A., NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS: FINAL REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 12–13 (2015); The Inherent Danger of Stand Your Ground Laws, 
EVERYTOWN (Feb. 8, 2019) (citing JOHN K. ROMAN, RACE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE, AND 
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Police have also singled out and overly scrutinized the lawful actions of the 
transgender community, from enforcing so-called “impersonation or masquer-
ade laws”25 and issuing disturbing the peace citations for gender nonconform-
ing dress,26 to baselessly arresting individuals for prostitution based on tran-
sphobic assumptions about sexual behavior.27 Increasingly, as Ky Peterson, 
CeCe McDonald,28 and other Black transgender victims of violence have 
learned, lawfully protecting oneself from violent physical assault has merely 
provided police another opportunity to scrutinize, over-enforce, and over-
criminalize a vulnerable and marginalized community. 
This Essay highlights the need for, and elusiveness of, self-defense as a vi-
able affirmative defense for the Black transgender community and the central 
role law enforcement plays in this narrative. Police protection is needed but 
largely remains unavailable to this disproportionately victimized community, 
making self-defense a necessary last resort. But police over-enforcement and 
criminalization of this community renders self-defense an elusive tool of legal 
protection, especially when other institutional actors—prosecutors, judges, and 
juries—may harbor many of the same pernicious prejudices infecting precincts 
across the country. 
Recent events in Brunswick, Georgia, three hours from Ky Peterson’s rape 
and self-defensive actions, highlight the urgent need to confront this issue.29 In-
 
STAND YOUR GROUND LAWS: ANALYSIS OF FBI SUPPLEMENTARY HOMICIDE REPORT DATA 7 
tbl.2 (2013)), https://everytownresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2020/07/inherent-dan 
ger-stand-ground-laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/7S84-G8YY] (“When white shooters kill black 
victims, the resulting homicides are deemed justifiable 11 times more frequently than when 
the shooter is Black and the victim is white.”). 
25  Buist, supra note 15, at 885–86 (summarizing a long history of “anti-cross-dressing” 
laws). 
26  Gabriel Arkles, Correcting Race and Gender: Prison Regulation of Social Hierarchy 
Through Dress, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 859, 882 (2012) (“In 2011, Oklahoma police arrested a 
Black trans woman for disorderly conduct because she wore high heels and carried a purse in 
a public park.”); see Galbreath v. City of Oklahoma City, No. CIV-11-1336-HE, 2012 WL 
255734, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2012) (providing the arresting officer’s account of the 
reasons for the arrest). 
27  See Buist, supra note 15, at 886 (recounting the story of Monica Jones, a Black trans 
woman who was arrested in 2014 in Phoenix, Arizona on suspicion of prostitution based in 
part on her appearance and transgender identity). 
28  See Sabrina Rubin Erdely, The Transgender Crucible, ROLLING STONE (July 30, 2014, 
2:00 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/the-transgender-crucible-1140 
95 [https://perma.cc/UVR5-4Y35] (describing the case of a homeless transgender woman 
who was attacked by a group of men hurling racist and transphobic insults, defended herself 
with a glass bottle, stabbed and killed an attacker with a visible swastika tattoo, and was 
charged with second degree murder before pleading guilty to manslaughter). 
29  Charles M. Blow, The Killing of Ahmaud Arbery, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/06/opinion/ahmaud-arbery-killing.html [https://perma.cc/ 
H7AH-6W35] (describing the case of Ahmaud Arbery, an unarmed black man chased and 
shot dead by two White men during a botched “citizen’s arrest” based solely on their mistak-
en assumption that he was an armed robbery suspect). 
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deed, when a District Attorney can claim that two White men chasing and gun-
ning down an unarmed Black man in broad daylight as part of a “citizen’s ar-
rest” was a justifiable act of self-defense, one cannot help but wonder why Ky 
Peterson sits in a Georgia prison today.30 
I. THE NEED FOR SELF-PROTECTION 
This Essay posits a greater need among the Black transgender population 
to employ self-defense as a survival strategy for two primary reasons. First, 
rates of violence—including sexual violence, intimate partner violence, and 
murder—are far higher for this population than the national average. Second, 
Black transgender victims of violence cannot reliably depend on law enforce-
ment for protection from their perpetrators. These victims who report their 
crimes face ambivalence, claims of dishonesty, discrimination, and violence 
from the very police charged with protecting them. This dual reality that Black 
transgender individuals are both more likely to be violently assaulted and less 
likely to be protected by police often makes self-defense the last available op-
tion. 
A. Rates of Violence 
Reliable data on transgender populations remains scarce for a variety of 
reasons,31 but government agencies and human rights organizations uniformly 
report that the transgender community faces disproportionate rates of violence 
in the United States.32 Much of this violence involves transphobic harassment 
regarding gender identity and gender-based sexual violence. The National Re-
source Center on Domestic Violence (NRCDV) reported that, according to a 
2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, 46 percent of respondents were “verbally har-
assed in the past year because of being transgender,” 9 percent “were physical-
 
30  Id. (quoting two prosecutors who recused themselves from the case after making state-
ments that the killing was justified, alternatively because “[a] private person may arrest an 
offender if the offense is committed in his presence or within his immediate knowledge,” 
and that “[g]iven the fact that Arbery initiated the fight, at the point Arbery grabbed the 
shotgun, under Georgia law, McMichael was allowed to use deadly force to protect him-
self”). Video footage later released of the incident refutes this claim. Id. 
31  See FORGE, TRANSGENDER RATES OF VIOLENCE (2012), https://forge-forward.org/resourc 
e/rates-of-violence [https://perma.cc/QDP5-UQD9]. 
32  See Nat’l Res. Ctr. on Domestic Violence, Violence Against Trans and Non-Binary Peo-
ple, https://vawnet.org/sc/serving-trans-and-non-binary-survivors-domestic-and-sexual-viole 
nce/violence-against-trans-and [https://perma.cc/GUT9-WBEU]; FORGE, supra note 31; 
Off. for Victims of Crime, Responding to Transgender Victims of Sexual Assault: The Num-
bers (June 2014), https://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/pubs/forge/sexual_number 
s.html [https://perma.cc/UNU3-PSQ3]; see also Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 7 
(“[T]ransgender women are at exceptionally high risk of experiencing violence and harass-
ment, which is meted out by both private and state actors, and both in private and institution-
al spaces.”). 
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ly attacked . . . because of being transgender,” 47 percent had been the victim 
of a sexual assault, and 54 percent had experienced “intimate partner vio-
lence.”33 These rates of violence are double, and in some cases triple, the com-
monly reported rates of sexual violence and intimate partner abuse.34 Moreover, 
both NRCDV and the federal government’s Office for Victims of Crime report 
that rates of violence in the transgender community are even higher for 
transgender communities of color, especially Black transgender individuals.35 
Scholars examining this data have explored the multilayered discrimination 
facing this intersectional group. Particularly for victims of intimate partner vio-
lence (IPV), “[s]tatistics show that Black women suffer from intimate partner 
violence at a higher rate than white women . . . [and] that trans people are at an 
increased risk for intimate partner violence” within that group.36 This dispro-
portionate impact is reflected in lethal IPV cases as well:  
[m]ore than [50] percent of female homicide victims between the ages of eight-
een and forty-four are killed by an intimate partner, and Black women are killed 
at a rate almost three times that of white women. [Within that group,] 
[t]ransgender persons are also at an increased risk for intimate partner violence 
because of transphobia within their intimate relationships.37 
Some scholars have explained that these increased rates of IPV and sexual vio-
lence reflect a desire to control and enforce gender norms within relationships38 
and vulnerability for transgender people who cannot conform to these gender 
stereotypes.39 
There certainly exists room at the margins to quibble with the accuracy of 
these quoted statistics because little consistent demographic data has been col-
 
33  Nat’l Res. Ctr. on Domestic Violence, supra note 32. 
34  Off. for Victims of Crime, supra note 32; see also Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17 
(nothing that Black transgender women “experience domestic violence at extraordinary 
rates”). 
35  Off. for Victims of Crime, supra note 32; see also TAYLOR N.T. BROWN & JODY L. 
HERMAN, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL ABUSE AMONG LGBT PEOPLE: A 
REVIEW OF EXISTING RESEARCH 3, 5, 14 (2015); Buist, supra note 15, at 877 (“[T]he 
transgender community . . . faces unheard of rates of violence, especially transgender women 
of color. Transgender women of color are murdered in the United States at rates that contin-
ue to increase.”); Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17 (“Every year in recent history has 
seen the murder of scores of transgender women of color, most notably Black transgender 
women.”). 
36  Ijoma, supra note 1, at 255–56; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 39 
(2011) (finding that “rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner” is more 
prevalent among Black women than white women). 
37  Ijoma, supra note 1, at 260 (footnote omitted); see also Leigh Goodmark, Transgender 
People, Intimate Partner Abuse, and the Legal System, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51, 91–
93 (2013). 
38  Goodmark, supra note 37, at 94. 
39  Id. 
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lected about this population.40 But legal observers and human rights groups 
agree that these shocking statistics are almost certainly underreported.41 
B. Police (Non)responsiveness 
Given the reality that Black transgender individuals face disproportionate 
rates of violence, “one would reasonably conclude that law enforcement ought 
to be doing everything in their power to protect transgender women [and men] 
from violence at the hands of private actors. However, . . . the converse appears 
to be true.”42 Disturbing anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests police re-
spond to transgender victims with a mixture of ambivalence, distrust, transpho-
bic discrimination, and violence. 
Much of this troubling official response appears linked to regressive atti-
tudes about gender normativity. For example, IPV “is just as prevalent if not 
more prevalent in same-sex relationships, yet the enforcement of criminal law 
regarding arrests of such offenders is [more] limited” than in opposite-sex rela-
tionships.43 One explanation proffered by scholars and police themselves is that 
“officers are more likely to take heterosexual IPV more seriously and see 
straight male offenders as the more serious perpetrators,” in part because of be-
liefs about the inherent fragility of women in opposite-sex relationships.44 
More broadly, transgender victims of crime “report a high frequency of 
negative interactions with law enforcement,” both when reporting criminal ac-
 
40  The transgender community, and the broader LGBTQ+ community, has fought for years 
even to be officially counted by government bureaus. See Alex Ronan, How Big Is the 
Transgender Population?, CUT (June 11, 2015), https://www.thecut.com/2015/06/how-big-
is-the-transgender-population.html [https://perma.cc/2XGC-R6RL] (“There’s no national 
data on the size of the transgender population because official record collectors like the 
United States Census Bureau don’t ask about gender identity.”); Mary Emily O’Hara, 
LGBTQ Americans Won’t Be Counted in 2020 U.S. Census After All, NBC NEWS (Mar. 29, 
2017, 10:27 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/lgbtq-americans-won-t-be-cou 
nted-2020-u-s-census-n739911 [https://perma.cc/Z5MS-YVTC]; ANDREW R. FLORES ET AL., 
HOW MANY ADULTS IDENTIFY AS TRANSGENDER IN THE UNITED STATES? 2 (2016), 
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/publications/trans-adults-united-states [https://perma.cc 
/YX86-A48D] (“Population-based surveys . . . rarely ask questions to identify transgender 
people . . . .”). 
41  A National Epidemic: Fatal Anti-Transgender Violence in the United States in 2019, 
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Nov. 2019), https://www.hrc.org/resources/a-national-epidemic-fatal-
anti-trans-violence-in-the-united-states-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/84JD-UH6N] (explaining 
that rates of violence against the transgender community “very likely undercount the number 
of transgender and gender non-conforming people who [are] killed in the United 
States . . . often because authorities, journalists and/or family members refuse to 
acknowledge [the victim’s] gender correctly”). 
42  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 9, 12; see also AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 19, at 
65, 71. 
43  Buist, supra note 15, at 883; ADAM M. MESSINGER, LGBTQ INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE: LESSONS FOR POLICY, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH 5 (2017). 
44  Buist, supra note 15, at 884. 
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tivity and when being approached by police.45 Nearly one-third of all 
transgender victim respondents report “being treated in a generally disrespect-
ful way by police,” while 47 percent of Black transgender victims report being 
“disrespected by police.”46 
Much of this reported disrespect takes the form of disbelieving or discredit-
ing transgender victim stories of violence. While victims of sexual violence and 
IPV across the board—particularly victims identifying as female—suffer from 
the “credibility discount” by an ambivalent and skeptical criminal legal sys-
tem,47 transgender violence victims often confront the unique false stereotype 
that they are inherently “deceitful.”48 For decades, many states expressly man-
dated binary gender conformity under threat of punishment, criminalizing the 
“impersonation” of a gender not in conformance with one’s assigned birth 
sex.49 “These [anti-cross dressing] or masquerade laws have contributed to the 
lie that queer folks, . . . especially transgender folks, are deceptive by nature 
and not to be trusted, which in turn exacerbates the distrust between law en-
forcement and the queer community.”50 
This mutual distrust is reflected not only in police skepticism of 
transgender victims but in “[l]aw enforcement’s pervasive profiling of 
transgender women, particularly those of color, as sex workers.”51 Transgender 
women “overwhelmingly report [this] very specific problem,” noting that po-
lice subject them to “aggressive, often abusive, policing practices based upon 
 
45  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 13; see also Buist, supra note 15, at 886; ERIN 
FITZGERALD ET AL., MEANINGFUL WORK: TRANSGENDER EXPERIENCES IN THE SEX TRADE 5 
(2015). 
46  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 13. 
47  Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57 (2017) (describing the “credibility discount,” that is, “the legal rules 
that once formally embedded skepticism of rape complaints, and . . . [the] contemporary out-
let for this skepticism in police and prosecutorial responses to sexual violence”). 
48  Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the Law: Toward a Social and Legal 
Conceptualization of Gender That Is More Inclusive of Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 253, 263 (2005) (“[T]he sex-gender distinction plays into a belief that 
transgender people are deceitful, a belief that can cost transgender people their lives.”); Cyn-
thia Lee & Peter Kwan, The Trans Panic Defense: Masculinity, Heteronormativity, and the 
Murder of Transgender Women, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 114 (2014) (explaining that the trans 
panic defense rests on the premise that a transgender woman is being deceitful if she does 
not disclose her biological sex); Cynthia Lee, The Trans Panic Defense Revisited, 57 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1411, 1444 (2020) (same). 
49  See Buist, supra note 15, at 885; Lauren Bishop, Gender and Sex Designations for Identi-
fication Purposes: A Discussion on Inclusive Documentation for a Less Assimilationist Soci-
ety, 30 WIS. J.L., GENDER & SOC’Y 131, 150 (2015) (“[P]ast sumptuary laws . . . gave police 
the authority to arrest anyone found ‘impersonating another gender’ by not wearing ‘gender 
appropriate clothing.’ ”). 
50  Buist, supra note 15, at 885–86 (“Police have long-viewed the queer community not as a 
group in need of understanding and support, but in need of surveillance and punishment.”). 
51  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 5–6 (footnote omitted); see FITZGERALD ET AL., 
supra note 45, at 17. 
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law enforcement’s perception that they are universally and perpetually engaged 
in sex work.”52 “This phenomenon,” wherein officers “stop, harass, and de-
mand identification from transgender women,” command that they disperse, 
and “arrest them for low-level [quality of life] offenses tied to suspicions of 
prostitution . . . is sufficiently widespread that the transgender community has 
given it the colloquial label ‘walking while trans.’ ”53 This specific form of po-
lice harassment also disproportionately affects the Black transgender communi-
ty, with 38 percent of these individuals reporting profile-based harassment, 
compared with 22 percent of all transgender individuals.54 
Many vaguely worded local ordinances criminalizing the “manifestation” 
of an intent to engage in prostitution, which often turn on subjective factors 
such as how often a person stops and engages passersby in conversation, only 
exacerbate this profiling.55 As Monica Jones, a Black transgender student at Ar-
izona State University learned, “[t]he difference between ‘innocent’ and ‘crim-
inal’ behavior often comes down to how a person looks.”56 Jones reported be-
ing repeatedly harassed by police and suspected of solicitation on four 
occasions, including while “walking to the grocery store” and “visiting with a 
friend on the sidewalk,” before finally being arrested for manifesting an intent 
to engage in prostitution in May 2014.57 Despite neither engaging in nor har-
boring any intent to engage in sex work,58 Jones suffered the dual discrimina-
tion of being suspected of criminal activity because of her race59 and being sus-
pected of “deceitful” and “hypersexual”60 conduct because of her transgender 
identity. 
C. Self-Defense as a Last Resort 
Police skepticism, harassment, and profiling of Black transgender individ-
uals “significantly erodes the level of trust and comfort” this population feels 
“with respect to law enforcement,” which in turn dramatically suppresses crime 
reporting among this group.61 This distrust also makes self-help measures, in-
 
52  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 13–14. 
53  Id. at 6. 
54  Id. at 13. 
55  Chase Strangio, Arrested for Walking While Trans: An Interview with Monica Jones, 
ACLU CRIM. L. REFORM BLOG (Apr. 2, 2014, 11:19 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/crimina 
l-law-reform/arrested-walking-while-trans-interview-monica-jones [https://perma.cc/N7EU- 
7UUA]. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  See id. 
59  Id. 
60  See Ijoma, supra note 1, at 273, 283. 
61  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 16; see also JAMIE M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L GAY 
& LESBIAN TASK FORCE & NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY 
TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 162 (2011) 
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cluding violent self-defense, a more attractive option for this vulnerable inter-
sectional population.62 
But this calculation to take self-help measures is driven by more than pref-
erence. It is one of survival. Sexual violence and harassment against 
transgender women, especially Black transgender women, “is especially perva-
sive in the endemically violent and highly gender-segregated institutions that 
make up the American criminal justice system.”63 When Black transgender vic-
tims interact with law enforcement, either voluntarily or involuntarily, they run 
the very real risk that they will be profiled, arrested and charged, and placed in 
a prison system where they disproportionately “suffer unusually brutal hard-
ships.”64 These binary, gender-segregated prisons make transgender women in 
particular extraordinarily vulnerable to attacks by men incarcerated in the same 
facility. In one recent case, a transgender woman was arrested “regarding 
something minor. Due to my gender being marked male, I was put in with the 
men. Within [fifteen] minutes, I was raped by [three] different men.”65 
In short, the threat of police harassment, coupled with the threat of sexual 
violence in prison, compels many Black transgender victims to believe that po-
lice “may be more dangerous than perpetrators of violence.”66 As a result, these 
victims may choose to remain with abusers rather than report them to the po-
lice, and when necessary, protect themselves through self-defense as the last 
and only resort. 
II. THE ELUSIVENESS OF SELF-DEFENSE 
Both the over-victimization of Black transgender individuals by private ac-
tors and the under-protection of these individuals by law enforcement compel a 
greater need for self-help measures. As the experiences of Ky Peterson and 
CeCe McDonald illustrate, sometimes these necessary self-help measures in-
 
(“Police harassment and assault had an apparent deterrent effect on respondents’ willingness 
to seek out help from law enforcement.”). 
62  See Buist, supra note 15, at 878, 885 (“[Q]ueer criminology studies the persistent distrust 
that the LGBTQ+ community has of police . . . . [E]xisting studies . . . continue to reveal 
queer folks’ distrust of police and in turn polices’ distrust of queer folks.”). 
63  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 7; see also id. at 10 n.21 (“[T]ransgender inmates 
in American prisons who have not undergone sex reassignment surgery ‘are generally classi-
fied according to their birth sex for purposes of prison housing, regardless of how long they 
may have lived as a member of the other gender . . . .’ ” (quoting Chapter Three: Classifica-
tion and Housing of Transgender Inmates in American Prisons, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1746, 
1748 (2014))). 
64  Id. at 7. 
65  Id. at 11 (citing GRANT ET AL., supra note 61, at 168). 
66  Id. at 9; see also Ijoma, supra note 1, at 286 (“[P]olice arrests of transgender people who 
report intimate partner violence and sexual assault are frequent.”); ANDREA J. RITCHIE, 
INVISIBLE NO MORE: POLICE VIOLENCE AGAINST BLACK WOMEN AND WOMEN OF COLOR 191 
(2017) (“Advocates also told us that, where domestic violence against transgender women is 
concerned, officers often laugh, or say, ‘You’re a man, too. You can handle yourself . . . .’ ”). 
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volve lethal self-defense. At common law, states recognized as legitimate—
indeed, justified—such killing in self-defense when reasonably necessary to re-
pel an imminent, proportional attack. More recently, states have codified broad 
expansions of this affirmative defense and relaxed its narrow application, au-
thorizing citizens to “stand their ground” and eliminating the duty to retreat 
from conflict even where it is possible to do so. 
This expansion should be good news to Black transgender victims forced 
to defend themselves. Unfortunately, many of the same stereotypes corroding 
transgender victims’ interactions with law enforcement similarly infect the 
prosecutors, judges, and juries assessing the validity of their self-defense 
claims. The end result is a system that both refuses to protect this vulnerable 
population from private violence and then punishes them for lawfully exercis-
ing their right to protect themselves. 
A. Common Law Self-Defense 
The intentional killing of another person is regarded as the most morally 
blameworthy, and thus most severely punished, act in criminal law.67 As a re-
sult, “[t]he legal principles that permit the use of deadly force in self-defense 
present a very limited exception to the rule that killing is illegal.”68 Affirmative 
self-defense provides a legal justification to homicide, communicating society’s 
moral judgment that the violent act itself was not just “understandable” but ac-
tually “desirable.”69 
Not surprisingly, this legal justification to kill has traditionally been nar-
rowly defined and applied. At common law, a person could only use force in 
self-defense if she honestly and reasonably believed that she was in imminent 
danger, force was necessary to avoid the danger, and the force used was pro-
portional to the threat.70 “These four elements—imminence of threat, necessity, 
 
67  State v. Brown, 931 P.2d 69, 72 (N.M. 1996) (“First-degree murder is reserved for the 
most blameworthy or ‘the most heinous and reprehensible’ class of homicides . . . .” (quoting 
State v. Garcia, 837 P.2d 862, 865 (N.M. 1992))); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
796–97 (1982) (holding that imposing the death penalty for felony murder violates the 
Eighth Amendment when the defendant does not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill the vic-
tim); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008) (holding that imposing the death pen-
alty for the rape of a child violates the Eighth Amendment); Stephanie N. O’Banion, Dying 
in Detention: Are Life Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Non-Homicide Offenders Al-
ways Unconstitutionally Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment?, 38 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 449, 463 (“[I]t is the culpability of the offender . . . that causes society to 
consider a homicide crime more morally blameworthy than all other crimes.”). 
68  Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1658. 
69  Id. 
70  2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 127 (15th ed. 2018) (a person may kill in self-defense if 
“he reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or suffering great 
bodily harm”). 
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proportionality, and reasonableness—form the legal bounds of traditional self-
defense doctrine.”71 
Two of these elements—necessity and reasonableness—require brief fur-
ther discussion for purposes of this Essay. Necessity requires that the use of 
force be the only available option; if a safe retreat or de-escalation is available, 
force may not be used.72 The one exception to that requirement exists in the 
home, where in “defense of habitation” a person need not retreat to use force to 
defend oneself.73 This “castle doctrine” has existed in English common law for 
hundreds of years and until recently was strictly confined to the home.74 How-
ever, as discussed below, state legislatures have enacted a series of laws in-
creasingly allowing the use of force in public places even when a safe retreat 
option exists. These so-called “Stand Your Ground” laws have extended the 
castle doctrine to virtually any private or public space in society.75 
As for reasonableness, the adjudication of this element presents challeng-
ing problems fraught not only with the inherent subjectivity of the shooter’s 
mental state but with larger societal issues related to race, gender, age, and oth-
er demographic markers. “Reasonableness” has long been viewed from the per-
spective of the reasonable White man in American law and culture, and what is 
collectively viewed as “reasonable” may very well have implicit or explicit rac-
ist, sexist, and gender normative contours, both for the shooter and for the “vic-
tim.”76 Many scholars have critiqued this reasonableness requirement as inher-
ently infected with society’s collective implicit bias that it is reasonable to 
assess dark-skinned individuals as more threatening and to act accordingly in 
self-defensive response.77 But as discussed below, this bias works in reverse. 
 
71  Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1659. 
72  See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 134–36 (1998). 
73  See State v. Kuhns, 817 S.E.2d 828, 830 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018) (“ ‘[A] man’s house, how-
ever humble, is his castle, and his castle he is entitled to protect against invasion[.]’ . . . 
Commonly known as the ‘castle doctrine,’ the defense of habitation is ‘based on the theory 
that if a person is bound to become a fugitive from her own home, there would be no refuge 
for her anywhere in the world.’ ” (citations omitted) (first quoting State v. Gray, 77 S.E. 833, 
835 (1913); then quoting State v. Stevenson, 344 S.E.2d 334, 335 (1986))). 
74  Id.; see Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 774, 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (“The castle doc-
trine is of ancient origin . . . .”). 
75  See infra Section II.B. 
76  See Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 23, at 1584–85 (observing that implicit bias 
from the dominant White majority affects a jury’s reasonableness calculus: “If most individ-
uals would be more likely to ‘see’ a weapon in the hands of an unarmed Black person than in 
the hands of an unarmed White person . . . then jurors in self-defense cases may also be more 
likely to find that an individual who says he shot an unarmed Black person in self-
defense . . . acted reasonably, even if he was mistaken.”). 
77  L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 
IOWA L. REV. 293, 310 (2012) (“Blacks serve as our mental prototype (i.e., stereotype) for 
the violent street criminal.”); id. at 314 (“When the person being judged fits a criminal stere-
otype, the suspicion heuristic can cause the actor more easily to believe honestly—but mis-
takenly—that the person poses a threat and that deadly force is necessary . . . .”). 
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The same stereotype mythologizing racial minorities as inherently violent also 
calls into question the “reasonableness” of violent self-defensive actions taken 
by those same minorities, even if otherwise necessary and lawful. 
B. Stand Your Ground 
In the last two decades, states have expanded the centuries-old “core” self-
defense doctrine through a series of legislative enactments collectively referred 
to as “Stand Your Ground” laws.78 These laws remove any duty to retreat when 
a person feels threatened and permit the use of deadly force in public if the per-
son reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodi-
ly harm.79 
Stand Your Ground laws upend traditional self-defense doctrine in numer-
ous ways. Under traditional self-defense law, a person can use force to defend 
themselves anywhere, but when they are outside their home they cannot use 
force likely to kill or seriously injure someone if there is a safe way to avoid 
doing so.80 This traditional law respects both a person’s right to self-defense 
and the sanctity of human life by requiring someone to avoid taking a life if a 
clear and safe alternative exists.81 
Conversely, the well-established castle doctrine exception allows a person 
inside their home to defend themselves with force even if they could have safe-
ly walked away.82 Stand Your Ground laws remove the duty to retreat by allow-
ing people to shoot to kill in public even if a clear and safe alternative exists. At 
least thirty-five jurisdictions have some version of Stand Your Ground, either 
through legislative enactment or judicial order, while another three have ex-
panded the castle doctrine.83 
In addition to expanding the castle doctrine to apply broadly anywhere in 
public, Stand Your Ground laws significantly relax the requirements of immi-
nence and proportionality, necessarily broadening what the law will recognize 
as a justified homicide. Under traditional self-defense law, “a defendant must 
demonstrate that the threatened harm to which he is reacting is imminent,” un-
 
78  See Lave, supra note 11. 
79  See Aya Gruber, Race to Incarcerate: Punitive Impulse and the Bid to Repeal Stand Your 
Ground, 68 U. MIA. L. REV. 961, 962 (2014). 
80  See Lave, supra note 11 (analyzing the difference between “Stand Your Ground [and] a 
more traditional self-defense law”); Cynthia V. Ward, “Stand Your Ground” and Self-
Defense, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 89, 93–100 (2015) (discussing the historical and legal develop-
ment of the traditional self-defense rule in criminal law). 
81  See Stand Your Ground, supra note 12. 
82  Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, the Castle Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 
MARQ. L. REV. 653, 667 (2003) (“In the case of defense of habitation, the Castle Doctrine 
allows the resident to stand ground and use deadly force against the intruder to protect the 
sanctity of the home from the attempted atrocious felony because the duty to retreat would 
be incompatible with the goal of preventing the commission of the felony.”). 
83  Stand Your Ground, supra note 12. 
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less the defendant is confronted with an intruder in his own home.84 But by ex-
panding this “defense of habitation” rule to all public spaces, Stand Your 
Ground laws create “a presumption of imminent threat when an intruder tries to 
break into an unoccupied building, car, or a boat.”85 Some states do not even 
require the intruder to be actively intruding, but only near the structure, stretch-
ing the meaning of the word “imminent” to strain credulity.86 
A growing chorus of scholars and activists harshly criticize Stand Your 
Ground laws, pointing to damning empirical evidence significantly correlating 
the laws with increased violent crime.87 It is indisputable that these laws “are 
associated with higher rates of homicides.”88 A 2012 study by researchers at 
Texas A&M found that Stand Your Ground jurisdictions saw a significant in-
crease in homicide rates, with an average of more than 600 additional homi-
cides per year.89 
Moreover, Stand Your Ground laws have a clear disproportionate impact 
on communities of color.90 In advocating for the repeal of Stand Your Ground 
laws, the advocacy group Everytown for Gun Safety noted that “[w]hen white 
shooters kill Black victims, the resulting homicides are deemed justifiable 
[eleven] times more frequently than when the shooter is Black and the victim is 
white.”91 Therefore, the death of a minority individual in a Stand Your Ground 
case is “half as likely to lead to a conviction, compared to cases with white vic-
tims.”92 Similarly, the American Bar Association has highlighted that Stand 
Your Ground laws exacerbate existing racial tensions and “perpetuate[] a fool-
ish bravado of those who feel a bold security when they have a gun in their 
hand, and it exonerates an arrogance and/or ignorance.”93 
Researchers have also shown that implicit bias and cultural misperceptions 
of racial minorities as “more violent” or “more aggressive” exacerbate the dis-
proportionate impact of Stand Your Ground laws.94 Many scholars have noted 
the importance of race and racial stereotypes as public policy considerations 
when considering whether to repeal Stand Your Ground laws, explaining that 
 
84  Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1679, 1680. 
85  Id. at 1681. 
86  Id. at 1681, 1685, 1688, 1690. 
87  See, e.g., Lave, supra note 11, at 856; Gruber, supra note 79, at 964; Shawn E. Fields, 
Weaponized Racial Fear, 93 TUL. L. REV. 931, 987 (2019) (criticizing Stand Your Ground 
laws as a form of state sanction for racially fearful “vigilantes” to police the color line in 
public). 
88  A.B.A., supra note 24, at 6, 11–14 (2015) (citing data from four nationwide surveys). 
89  Id. at 11. 
90  Id. at 24–26. 
91  The Inherent Danger of Stand Your Ground Laws, supra, note 24. 
92  Id. 
93  A.B.A., supra note 24, at 24 (quoting Leonard Leach, Reverend, Mt. Hebron Missionary 
Baptist Church). 
94  Id. 
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cross-racial and cross-cultural fears and perceptions can unfairly impact the 
reasonableness prong in a justifiable homicide analysis.95 
These critics focus primarily on the detrimental impacts Stand Your 
Ground laws have on Black people and other persons of color as unfair targets 
of lethal violence from armed vigilantes.96 As one attorney representing the 
family of a Black victim of a purported Stand Your Ground homicide observed, 
“minority communities are deathly afraid that Stand Your Ground law sits side-
by-side with racial profiling; the ticket to vigilante justice.”97 But these expand-
ed legal protections for self-defense measures, troubling as they are, should in 
theory at least provide a more accessible avenue to the type of legal sanction 
vulnerable groups like the Black transgender community need. In fact, con-
servative lobbying groups like the National Rifle Association (NRA) and 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) made this argument when 
first proposing model Stand Your Ground legislation.98 “According to the 
NRA, this type of legislation empowers innocent victims who have appealed to 
the court system for help, while recognizing that the process for approving an 
application for a gun permit may take too long for some victims.”99 
C. Structural Barriers to Self-Defense Protection 
Rather than providing greater protections for vulnerable victims, the pro-
tection of Stand Your Ground laws is unevenly available for minority victim 
populations, resulting in “a disparate impact on Black women and trans people 
of color.”100 Whether under traditional or expanded self-defense doctrine, per-
sistent biases in the criminal legal system about what makes a person a “vic-
tim” virtually foreclose affirmative self-defense for the Black transgender 
community. These pernicious biases include racist tropes about the inherent 
criminality of Black people, the transphobic beliefs about the community’s 
purported deceitfulness and hypersexuality, and this intersectional group’s ina-
bility to claim the discredited mantle of the “perfect victim.” 
1. Racist Tropes 
Scholars and historians have convincingly demonstrated that the racial 
apartheid defining much of this nation’s history was supported by racist fear-
 
95  See id. 
96  See, e.g., Fields, supra note 87, at 985, 988. 
97  A.B.A., supra note 24, at 24. 
98  Ijoma, supra note 1, at 256–57, 263 (“When the first version of a Stand-Your-Ground law 
was proposed in Florida, the NRA argued that laws expanding self-defense were designed to 
protect women . . . advocating for gun ownership as a solution to intimate partner violence 
(‘IVP’) and other various forms of gendered violence.”). 
99  Id. at 258. 
100  Id. at 255, 288; see also Fields, supra note 87, at 988; Lave, supra note 11, at 843. 
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mongering warning White America about the inherent criminality and violent 
propensities of Black people, particularly Black men.101 Myths of the “black 
bogeyman”102 have endured for centuries and taken many forms—from the “re-
bellious Negro,”103 to the “black brute” rapist,104 to the “super predator.”105 
These racist tropes of a Black criminal subclass are now so ingrained in the fab-
ric of American society that science long ago confirmed the existence of a per-
vasive, unconscious, and largely automatic bias against dark-skinned individu-
als as more hostile, criminal, and prone to violence.106 These biases infect 
nearly everyone.107 
 
101  Fran Lisa Buntman, Race, Reputation, and the Supreme Court: Valuing Blackness and 
Whiteness, 56 U. MIA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) (“In the United States, being black . . . has long 
been seen as a sign of criminality, or at least criminal propensity.”); Paul Finkelman, The 
Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063, 2070, 2072, 2077, 2090–91, 2093 (1993) (tracing the 
history of “blackness” as synonymous with crime to early court decisions justifying slavery 
because of the inherent criminality of black men). 
102  Laura T. Fishman, The Black Bogeyman and White Self-Righteousness, in IMAGES OF 
COLOR, IMAGES OF CRIME 109, 113 (1998). 
103  Bryan Adamson, “Thugs,” “Crooks,” and “Rebellious Negroes”: Racist and Racialized 
Media Coverage of Michael Brown and the Ferguson Demonstrations, 32 HARV. J. ON 
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 189, 226–27 (2016) (connecting the centuries-old “rebellious Negro 
trope” to current coverage of unarmed black men killed by police officers). 
104  R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 859–60 (2004) (describing the stereotype of “the black beast, a violent 
brute with an unusually powerful sexual appetite for white women who was completely de-
void of humanity”); Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Racial Character Evidence in Police Killing 
Cases, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 369, 408 (2018) (“The ‘black brute’ stereotype may be one of the 
most enduring in this nation’s history and persists even today.” (quoting Ryan P. Alford, Ap-
pellate Review of Racist Summations: Redeeming the Promise of Searching Analysis, 11 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 325, 346 (2006))); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and 
the Intersection of Race and Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 59 
(1996) (recalling how the “Southern myth of the ‘black-beast’ rapist justified lynching” in 
the post-Reconstruction South). 
105  Robert J. Smith & Zoë Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the Progression of Punish-
ment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 425 (2017) (tracing the genesis of the “super-predators” 
myth to a warning by Professor John DiIulio “of a coming ‘breed’ of juvenile offenders” 
who are “fatherless, Godless, and jobless” and who “kill, rape, [and] maim, without giving it 
a second thought”); Robert Mackey, 1996: Hillary Clinton on ‘Superpredators’, C-SPAN 
(Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4582473/hillary-clinton-super-predators-
1996 [https://perma.cc/PA5D-V6MY] (video of then-First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton 
warning of “the kinds of kids that are called super-predators. No conscience, no empathy. 
We can talk about why they ended up that way, but first we have to bring them to heel.”). 
106  L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Tri-
age, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2629–31 (2013) (summarizing science of implicit bias and the 
widely-held implicit stereotype of “blacks as violent, hostile, aggressive and dangerous”); 
Rachel D. Godsil & L. Song Richardson, Racial Anxiety, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2235, 2238–45 
(2017) (connecting implicit racial bias to systemic “racial anxiety” in interracial interac-
tions). 
107  Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Af-
firmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1080 (2006) (“[I]mplicit bias . . . is pervasive but 
diffuse, consequential but unintended, ubiquitous but invisible.”); L. Song Richardson, Po-
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These racist tropes undergird not only the unjust targeting of innocent 
Black people as criminals but work to deny genuine Black victims their status 
as such. Empirical data overwhelmingly demonstrate that police, prosecutors, 
judges, and juries are far less likely to believe the claims of Black victims than 
White victims.108 This credibility discount in turn adversely affects those Black 
victims who resort to lawful self-defense, who have their affirmative self-
defense claims rejected as much as ten times more frequently than similar 
claims by White victims.109 
Much of the “black criminality” myth has been directed at Black men, but 
the unique rejection of claims by Black female victims of sexual and partner 
abuse can inform the experience of the Black transgender community as well, 
where significant overlap exists in the types of violence suffered. Black women 
are physically and sexually assaulted by intimate partners at higher rates than 
women of other races, but “cultural stereotypes and portrayals of the ‘angry’ 
and ‘independent’ Black woman have contributed to the perception that Black 
girls and women need ‘less protection’ than other women, especially white 
women.”110 This “myth of the angry and lascivious Black woman”111 delegiti-
mizes her fear in the White normative mainstream because such a woman nei-
ther fits the model of the fragile and weak victim nor “needs” the protection of 
society. 
The Black female experience intersects with the Black transgender experi-
ence in another important way because both groups “have been depicted as 
promiscuous and hypersexual.”112 Although both groups are subjected to sexual 
violence at rates two to three times that of the national average, the “white 
normative view that Black women are ‘less credible’ victims of rape, and other 
 
lice Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1169 (2012) (“[I]mplicit biases 
are ubiquitous, [but] they are also malleable.”). 
108  See Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1654–55 (summarizing federal and private studies show-
ing that Black criminal defendants are far less likely to successfully bring an affirmative self-
defense claim than their White criminal defendant counterparts); Tuerkheimer, supra note 47 
at 5–6 (observing that the “credibility discount” is felt more severely among Black women 
and other intersectional marginalized groups). 
109  Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1654. 
110  Ijoma, supra note 1, at 273 (quoting REBECCA EPSTEIN ET AL., GIRLS INTERRUPTED: THE 
ERASURE OF BLACK GIRLS’ CHILDHOOD 8, https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-inequali 
ty-center/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/08/girlhood-interrupted.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ 
D6-TLW6]). 
111  Id. at 270. 
112  Id. at 273 & n.115 (“explaining that ‘mainstream attitudes’ negated the victimization of 
Black women who were raped and sexually assaulted because of ‘ruinous myths about 
[B]lack women’s libidinous sexual proclivities’ ” (citing Kali Nicole Gross, African Ameri-
can Women, Mass Incarceration, and the Politics of Protection, 102 J. AM. HIST. 25, 26 
(2015)). 
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types of violence” permeates the criminal legal system.113 These views of Black 
women as angry, hypersexual, and promiscuous also delegitimize their valid 
claims of self-defense before a jury, which is less likely to see a victim lawfully 
standing her ground to protect herself and more likely to see a violent, uncon-
trollable criminal lashing out in rage. 
2. Transphobic Myths 
In addition to the institutional distrust of Black people as inherently violent 
and Black women as angry and hypersexual, official actors portray transgender 
victims as “inherently deceitful and deceptive because of their inability to con-
form to socially constructed gender norms.”114 This myth adversely impacts 
transgender victims’ interactions with police, who skeptically refuse to offer 
protection.115 But it also works to deny them otherwise available affirmative 
self-defense claims in criminal proceedings when transgender victims of vio-
lence protect themselves “because the prosecution—employing transphobic 
language and traditional gender norms—successfully portrays them as untrust-
worthy.”116 
This denial of affirmative self-defense protection exists particularly “[i]n 
cases involving transgender people who kill in response to abuse or sexual as-
sault.”117 Cisgender judges and juries often refuse or cannot “accept transgender 
people as victims of gendered crimes” like rape or IPV, instead questioning the 
legitimacy of such claims.118 The same skepticism greeting transgender men 
and women as “bad victims” when reporting abuse to police also affects them 
in the courtroom:  
[s]ome judges are skeptical of gender-based claims of violence by transgender 
litigants, insisting that because a transgender woman is not “biologically female” 
in the traditional sense, the abuse must instead be mutual violence within a 
same-sex relationship. Others have suggested that a claim of abuse is not credi-
ble because, by virtue of hir gender, the petitioner should be able to protect hir-
self.119 
This reality confirms the underlying thesis of this Essay: transgender peo-
ple, especially transgender people of color, are treated by the criminal legal sys-
tem as if they are neither deserving of protection nor self-defense. Black 
 
113  Id. at 274 (quoting Carolyn West, Black Women and Intimate Partner Violence: New Di-
rections for Research, 19 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1487, 1491 (2004)). 
114  Id. at 283; see Goodmark, supra note 37, at 73. 
115  Carpenter & Marshall, supra note 17, at 17. 
116  Ijoma, supra note 1, at 284 (citing JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 71–75 (2011)). 
117  Id. at 285. 
118  Id. 
119  Goodmark, supra note 37, at 89 (footnote omitted) (utilizing the gender-neutral pronouns 
“hir” and “hirself” often preferred by transgender and nonbinary individuals). 
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transgender victims are both excluded from state forms of legal protection and 
yet punished under the same systems. Rather than providing a much-needed 
pathway to self-protection, Stand Your Ground legislation is but an example of 
this under-protective, over-punitive reality. Federal homicide data over a ten-
year period revealed that “killings of Black people by White people were ruled 
justified 35 [percent] of the time,” while “[k]illings of White people by Black 
people were ruled justifiable in only 3 [percent] of cases.”120 Further, Black on 
White homicides were the least likely of over a dozen demographic combina-
tions to be deemed justified, while a study by the Marshall Project concluded 
that “killings of Black men by White people . . . were eight times more likely to 
be found justifiable than any other combination.”121 
Similarly reliable data including the experience of transgender individuals 
is scarce, but comparing the normative experiences of transgender victims and 
defendants suggests similarly shocking treatment. Black transgender individu-
als like Ky Peterson are denied the ability even to raise a valid Stand Your 
Ground defense in Georgia solely because of persistent transphobic attitudes 
denying transgender individuals “victim” status.122 In contrast, dozens of (most-
ly White) men have successfully raised the so-called “trans panic” defense to 
justify or mitigate the blame of killing a transgender individual, solely on the 
theory that discovery of one’s transgender identity can reasonably compel an-
gry, violent reaction, including murder.123 
3. “The Perfect Victim” 
The institutional denial of victimhood to Black transgender individuals 
communicates a societal judgment that people who behave in gender noncon-
forming or gender nonbinary ways are less deserving of protection from vio-
lence—especially sexual violence—because they engage in behavior of which 
we disapprove. Sexual assault advocates are familiar with these gender norma-
tive judgments, wherein burdens are placed on the (female) victim to prevent 
being raped by the (male) perpetrator. Women ought to take simple safety pre-
cautions (that men do not have to take), make smarter decisions (expending 
mental energy not required of men), or not put themselves “in the wrong place 
 
120  Rolnick, supra note 23, at 1654. 
121  Id. at 1654–55. 
122  See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text. 
123  See Lee, supra note 48, at 1411 (“The trans panic defense is not a traditional criminal law 
defense. . . . Rather, trans panic is a defense strategy associated with the provocation or heat 
of passion defense. A murder defendant . . . will claim that the discovery that the victim was 
a transgender female . . . provoked him into a heat of passion, causing him to lose his self-
control.”); id. at 1428 n.108 (summarizing successful gay and trans panic defenses). 
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at the wrong time” (places and times that are not off limits to men). In short, 
women ought to work diligently not to get raped.124 
This type of victim-blaming mentality derives from the myth of the “per-
fect victim,”125 the pure, virginal, modest, White woman who did nothing to 
provoke or invite her attack, and who is thus morally blameless.126 Despite the 
#MeToo Movement’s attempts to direct attention to the nuances of sexual as-
sault, and particularly the nuances of victim responses in vulnerable, coercive 
settings, society still identifies “the image of the ‘victim’ . . . [as] a blameless, 
pure stereotype, with whom all can identify.”127 A “victim” is “an elderly per-
son robbed of her life savings, an ‘innocent bystander’ injured or killed during 
a holdup, or a brutally ravaged rape victim. ‘Victims’ are not prostitutes beaten 
senseless . . . drug addicts mugged and robbed . . . or misdemeanants raped by 
cellmates.”128 
These gender normative, sexist, racist moral purity tests simply leave no 
room for a Black transgender victim of (sexual) violence. They institutionalize 
and reinforce that an already marginalized population is simply less deserving 
of society’s protection because of its perceived moral inferiority. Indeed, the 
“perfect victim” fallacy to which Black transgender victims are subjected rep-
resents a core dehumanization beyond the behavior-based shaming of most rape 
 
124  See, e.g., Charlotte Hilton Andersen, How to Teach Girls How Not to Get Raped, GREAT 
FITNESS EXPERIMENT (Jan. 10, 2013, 10:15 AM), http://www.thegreatfitnessexperiment.com/ 
2013/01/how-to-teach-girls-how-not-to-get-raped.html [https://web.archive.org/web/201301 
16230352/http://www.thegreatfitnessexperiment.com/2013/01/how-to-teach-girls-how-not-
to-get-raped.html] (describing a self-defense class in which the teacher told young girls to 
report any attempted assault or rape “[b]ecause if you don’t report it – what if your best 
friend comes walking along that same path [two] weeks later and gets raped? If you don’t 
report it then it’s your fault if other girls get hurt,” and offering suggestions for teaching pre-
vention of sexual assault in ways that would not shift responsibility to victims); KATIE 
ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 9 (1993) (describing 
the first week of college for a female student, where “there are fliers and counselors and vid-
eotapes telling us how not to get AIDS and how not to get raped, where not to wander and 
what signals not to send”). 
125  This use of the phrase “perfect victim” does not refer to the mythical “perfect rape vic-
tim,” who responds to unwanted sexual advances in the manner preferred by judges and ju-
ries—by screaming, offering forcible physical and verbal resistance, and by immediately 
calling the police and submitting to a medical examination. See Kelly Alison Behre, Ensur-
ing Choice and Voice for Campus Sexual Assault Victims: A Call for Victims’ Attorneys, 65 
DRAKE L. REV. 293, 352 (2017) (“[There is a] harmful rape myth . . . of the ‘perfect victim,’ 
promoting the idea that real victims of sexual assault respond to trauma in one uniform man-
ner.”). 
126  See Martha Chamallas, Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441, 442 (2005) (describing the 
mythical “ ‘perfect’ [rape] victim, who is young, white, and a virgin”); see also Hannah 
Brenner et al., Bars To Justice: The Impact of Rape Myths on Women in Prison, 17 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 521, 540 (2016) (“Rape myths inform the ‘ideal victimhood’ requirement that 
a victim be ‘carrying out a respectable project’ and is ‘not to be blamed.’ ”). 
127  Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 951 (1985). 
128  Id. 
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victims. Rather than critiquing the actions of this community as risky and 
blameworthy, this trope attacks the very personhood of the victim, critiquing 
the racial and gender identity central to their existence. 
CONCLUSION 
The experience of Black transgender people in the criminal legal system 
reflects a “legac[y] of an exclusionary politics of protection,” wherein they are 
not entitled to the law’s protection when they need it most but instead unjustly 
face its punishment by virtue of their existence.129 This vulnerable intersection-
al community experiences criminal violence at rates far in excess of the nation-
al average, yet their attempts to seek state protection result in a dangerous mix-
ture of ambivalence, discrimination, and state-sanctioned violence. 
Faced with this reality, the Black transgender community desperately needs 
access to the law’s recognition of protective self-defense. Legislative expan-
sions of core self-defense doctrine, problematic as they are for many marginal-
ized communities, should represent an opportunity for this community to exer-
cise lawful self-help measures as a last (and often only) resort. Unfortunately, 
this exclusionary politics of protection not only excludes Black transgender 
violence victims from police protection but from legal self-protection when 
they stand their ground and fight back against their assailants. This Essay high-
lights the dual problems of under-protection and over-punishment. The solu-
tions—more equitable, just, and compassionate treatment of Black transgender 
victims of crime—seem obvious. While this Essay does not attempt to sketch 
out an infrastructure for reform, hopefully shining a light on the problem can 
inform the urgent conversations to come. 
 
129  See Kali Nicole Gross, African American Women, Mass Incarceration, and the Politics of 
Protection, 102 J. AM. HIST. 25, 25 (2015). 
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